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 QUÉBEC/CANADA 
CONFERENCE BOARD DU CANADA 
G. Hodgson, « Façonner l’économie cana-
dienne sobre en carbone : Document de 
travail. », 20 mars 2017, 34 p. [L’accès à 
ce document nécessite une inscription 
gratuite] 
Un prix du carbone crée des incitatifs 
pour innover et réduire la consommation 
et la production d'hydrocarbures et 
d'émissions de GES avec un impact 
significativement plus faible sur le PIB 
que le recours à la réglementation 
Le Canada a entamé sa transition vers une écono-
mie sobre en carbone. Des cibles ambitieuses ont 
été fixées à l’échelle internationale et nationale, 
notamment la réduction des émissions de gaz à ef-
fet de serre (GES) de 80 % d’ici 2050. Le cadre 
stratégique élaboré pour guider cette transition, 
de même que diverses propositions et mesures 
concrètes, font actuellement l’objet d’intenses dis-
cussions jour après jour. De nombreuses entre-
prises et institutions étudient des options leur 
permettant de réduire leurs émissions de GES, et 
certaines explorent de nouvelles possibilités de 
croissance dans un monde produisant moins de 
carbone. Toutefois, on n’en est encore qu’au tout 
début; les progrès au Canada sont inégaux d’un 
secteur, d’une région et d’un gouvernement à 
l’autre. Un premier cadre stratégique pancana-
dien a été adopté, mais pas encore dans sa version 
définitive en raison de divergences qui persistent 
sur le plan des objectifs et des politiques dans cer-
tains domaines importants. [...] Afin de guider la 
transition, toute une série d’outils devront être 
élaborés et renforcés, dont les suivants : 1. Tarifi-
cation du carbone : il s’agit d’une politique pivot 
pour changer les incitations proposées aux con-
sommateurs et aux entreprises en vue de réduire 
leur consommation de carbone. Tout en ayant une 
incidence sur le PiB beaucoup moins élevée que le 
recours à la réglementation, la tarification du car-
bone encourage les parties prenantes à innover 
ainsi qu’à diminuer la consommation et la produc-
tion d’hydrocarbures et à réduire les émissions de 
GeS. 
FRASER INSTITUTE 
V. Geloso et B. Eisen, « Quebec's Daycare 
Program: A Flawed Policy Model », Mars 
2017, 11 p. 
Le modèle québécois des garderies 
subventionnées à 7 $ n'est pas 
envisageable pour les autres provinces 
canadiennes, car les revenus fiscaux 
générés par cette mesure ne dépassent 
pas le coût relié à celle-ci 
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In 1997, Quebec instituted a system of subsidized 
daycare, providing daycare spots at a daily rate of 
$5 per day regardless of parental income. Despite 
some modest reforms, this “universal” daycare 
program retains its original structure. 
Quebec’s system is expensive. The government 
spends over $9,000 per child served, for a total 
cost of approximately $2.6 billion in 2014/15. 
Nevertheless, Quebec’s daycare system has been 
held up by some as a model for other provinces: 
advocates argue increased maternal labour-force 
participation generates tax revenue that offsets 
program costs and that the program produces ben-
eficial child development outcomes. 
These claims should be treated skeptically. The 
resulting tax revenues from increased maternal 
labour-force participation likely do not offset the 
full cost of Quebec’s program. What’s more, the ef-
fects upon labour-force participation in Quebec 
cannot easily be generalized to the rest of Canada 
and daycare based on Quebec’s model would likely 
have significant fiscal costs if adopted elsewhere. 
Evidence for long-lasting child development gains 
from subsidized daycare is mixed. Troublingly, 
studies from Quebec show the program has con-
tributed to significantly worse health and social 
development outcomes. 
Although the program is often described as “uni-
versal”, Quebec has not solved the problem of ac-
cess and waiting times despite very high levels of 
government spending. Lengthy wait times remain 
in many areas, and children from higher income 
families are more likely to obtain a place in day-
care.  
INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE EN  
POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES (IRPP) 
C. M. Beach, « What Has Happened to 
Middle-Class Earnings in Canada? »,  
20 mars 2017, 20 p. 
L'augmentation marquée de la 
proportion de travailleurs ayant des 
revenus élevés est compatible avec un 
effet « d'amélioration » sur le marché  
du travail à mesure qu'un plus grand 
nombre de travailleurs deviennent 
mieux éduqués et occupent des emplois 
non routiniers mieux payés et que 
l'économie passe progressivement de la 
fabrication aux services  
Distributional concerns and issues of widening in-
come inequality have caught the public attention 
since the advent of the Great Recession and the 
Occupy Movement in the United States, as well as 
in western Europe and elsewhere (Atkinson 2015; 
Noah 2012; Stiglitz 2015). [...] My analysis reveals 
two main trends over the period from 1970 to 
2005: (1) a marked decline in the proportion of 
middle-class workers and a corresponding in-
crease in the proportions of both higher-earning 
and lower-earning workers among male and full-
time, full-year (FTFY) female workers; and (2) a 
dramatic increase in the earnings share of high 
earners, a corresponding drop in the earnings 
share of middle-class workers and an essentially 
unchanged earnings share of lower-earning work-
ers. Looking more specifically at the factors un-
derlying this important shift in earnings share be-
tween middle-class and high-earning workers 
over the 35-year period, I find that the decline in 
the proportion of middle-class workers in the 
workplace accounted for more than half of the sub-
stantial drop in their earnings share, while the in-
crease in the proportion of high-earning workers 
accounted for more than three-quarters of the rise 
in the earnings shares of high-earning male and 
FTFY female workers. Changes in the relative 
mean earnings of these groups of workers there-
fore played a much lesser role. Data for the more 
recent period from 2000 to 2005, however, suggest 
that the pattern has reversed. Indeed, a substan-
tial decline in the relative mean earnings of mid-
dle-class male and FTFY female workers ac-
counted for between two-thirds and three-quar-
ters of the fall in their earnings shares, and a cor-
responding strong increase in the relative mean -
earnings of -higher-earning male and FTFY fe-
male workers accounted for about one-half to two-
thirds of the rise in their earnings shares.  
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   ÉTATS-UNIS 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES (CBPP) 
A. Aron-Dine et T. Shaw, « House GOP 
Health Bill Still Cuts Tax Credits, Raises 
Costs by Thousands of Dollars for Mil-
lions of People », 22 mars 2017, 25 p. 
La « Trump Care » aurait eu pour effet 
d'augmenter la charge pour les 
personnes ayant un faible revenu ainsi 
que pour les personnes agées et ceux qui 
vivent dans un État où les coûts de santé 
sont élevés 
The updated House Republican legislation to re-
peal the Affordable Care Act (ACA) raises total 
out-of-pocket health costs (premiums, deductibles, 
copays, and coinsurance) by an average of $3,600 
in 2020 for people who buy health insurance 
through the ACA marketplaces — just as the pre-
vious version of this legislation would have done. 
Specifically, as explained below, tax credits that 
help people pay premiums would fall sharply (by 
an average of $2,200); average premiums would 
rise; and out-of-pocket costs such as deductibles, 
copays, and coinsurance would increase (by an av-
erage of $1,200). 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE 
Congressional Budget Office, « The 2017 
Long-Term Budget Outlook », 30 mars 
2017, 55 p. 
Sans modification législative, les États-
Unis connaîtront un déficit budgétaire et 
une dette de plus en plus élevée au cours 
des 30 prochaines années 
In CBO’s projections, deficits rise over the next 
three decades—from 2.9 percent of GDP in 2017 
to 9.8 percent in 2047—because spending growth 
is projected to outpace growth in revenues (see fig-
ure below). In particular, spending as a share of 
GDP increases for Social Security, the major 
health care programs (primarily Medicare), and 
interest on the government’s debt. 
Much of the spending growth for Social Security 
and Medicare results from the aging of the popu-
lation: As members of the baby-boom generation 
age and as life expectancy continues to increase, 
the percentage of the population age 65 or older 
will grow sharply, boosting the number of benefi-
ciaries of those programs. 
In addition, growth in spending on Medicare and 
the other major health care programs is driven by 
rising health care costs per person, which are pro-
jected to increase more quickly than GDP per cap-
ita (after the effects of aging and other demo-
graphic changes are removed). CBO projects that 
those health care costs will rise—although more 
slowly than they have in the past—in part because 
of the effects of new medical technologies and ris-
ing personal income. 
The federal government’s net interest costs are 
projected to rise sharply as a percentage of GDP 
for two main reasons. The first and more im-
portant is that interest rates are expected to rise 
from their current low levels, making any given 
amount of debt more costly to finance. The second 
reason is the projected increase in deficits: 
The larger they are, the more the government will 
need to borrow. 
Mandatory spending other than that for Social Se-
curity and the major health care programs—such 
as spending for federal employees’ pensions and 
for various income security programs—is pro-
jected to decline as a percentage of GDP, as is dis-
cretionary spending. (Mandatory spending is gen-
erally governed by provisions of permanent law, 
whereas discretionary spending is controlled by 
annual appropriation acts.) The projected decline 
in discretionary spending stems largely from the 
caps on discretionary funding that are set in law 
for the next several years. 
The modest projected growth in revenues relative 
to GDP over the next three decades is attributable 
to increases in individual income tax receipts. 
Those receipts are projected to grow mainly be-
cause CBO anticipates that income will rise more 
quickly than the price indexes that are used to ad-
just tax brackets. As a result, more income will be 
pushed into higher tax brackets over time. Com-
bined receipts from all other sources are projected 
to decline as a percentage of GDP. 
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INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY (ITEP) 
ITEP, « Fortune 500 Compagnies Hold a 
Record $2.6 Trillion Offshore: These Com-
pagnies Are Avoiding $767 Billion in U.S. 
Taxes », Mars 2017, 13 p. 
Inclure les revenus gagnés à l’étranger, 
dans l’année où ils sont gagnés, dans la 
déclaration d’impôt américaine réduirait 
les incitatifs à générer des revenus dans 
des paradis fiscaux 
It’s been well documented that major U.S. multi-
national corporations are stockpiling profits off-
shore to avoid U.S. taxes. Congressional hearings 
over the past few years have raised awareness of 
tax avoidance strategies of major technology cor-
porations such as Apple and Microsoft, but, as this 
report shows, a diverse array of companies are us-
ing offshore tax havens, including the pharmaceu-
tical giant Amgen; apparel manufacturers Levi 
Strauss and Nike; the financial firm American Ex-
press; banking giants Bank of America and Wells 
Fargo, and lesser known companies such as Ora-
cle and Symantec. 
All told, Fortune 500 corporations are avoiding up 
to $767 billion in U.S. federal income taxes by 
holding more than $2.6 trillion of “permanently 
reinvested” profits offshore. In their latest annual 
financial reports, 29 of these corporations reveal 
that they have paid an income tax rate of 10 per-
cent or less in countries where these profits are 
officially held, indicating that most of these profits 
are likely in offshore tax havens. 
TAX POLICY CENTER 
E. Toder, « Is a Territorial Tax System  
Viable for the United States? », 28 mars 
2017, 15 p. 
Diminuer l’impôt sur le revenu des 
particuliers et des entreprises pour 
augmenter les taxes à la consommation 
pourrait s’avérer viable pour les États-
Unis 
Territorial tax systems require clear rules to dis-
tinguish between taxable domestic and exempt 
foreign-source income. Defining the source of a 
multinational company’s profits is difficult, how-
ever, especially for profits that are attributable to 
intangible assets. Shifting of reported profits to 
low-tax countries with little economic activity is 
eroding territorial systems around the world. The 
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting report 
would limit these abusive transactions, while at-
tempting to maintain territorial systems that tax 
foreign affiliates of multinational companies as in-
dependent entities. Alternatives would abandon 
territorial systems altogether and seek different 
ways of taxing profits of multinational companies. 
TAX POLICY CENTER 
V. Williamson, « What Makes Taxes 
Seems Fair? », 29 mars 2017, 19 p. 
Résultats d’un sondage effectué auprès 
de 7 000 personnes à propos des impôts 
et taxes 
What makes people perceive their taxes as “fair”? 
We worked with the news website Vox to produce 
a short quiz about tax knowledge, which we used 
to test whether drawing readers’ attention to cer-
tain aspects of the tax code changed their opinions 
about the fairness of their own taxes. We found 
that receiving tax information did change reader’s 
opinions, but those changes were more substantial 
when participants were encouraged to think about 
how tax policy affects lower-income people rather 
than how it affects higher-income people. Several 
intriguing hypotheses, each worthy of additional 
research, follow from this demonstration. 
URBAN INSTITUTE 
K. Smith, S. Rose et D. Cosic, « How 
Might Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriage Affect Retirement Incomes and 
Federal Programs? », 7 novembre 2016, 
102 p. [rendu disponible à partir du  
27 mars 2017] 
Les changements légaux à la 
reconnaissance du mariage entre 
conjoints de même sexe ont une 
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incidence très minime sur le budget 
fédéral 
Federal recognition of same-sex marriage raises 
retirement incomes for some same-sex couples by 
providing them access to spouse and survivor ben-
efits from Social Security and employer sponsored 
retirement plans. DYNASIM, the Urban Insti-
tute's dynamic microsimulation model, projects 
that average per capita income in 2045 net of 
taxes and Medicare premiums for gays and lesbi-
ans ages 62 and older will be $ I,200 higher than 
it would have been had same-sex marriage not 
been legalized. Federal recognition of same-sex 
marriage also raises Social Security outlays but 
will not materially affect the Social Security trust 
fund because relatively few beneficiaries have a 
same-sex spouse. 
   INTERNATIONAL 
FONDS MONÉTAIRE INTERNA-
TIONAL (FMI) 
I. Guceri et L. Liu, « Effectiveness of Fis-
cal Incentives for R&D: Quasi-Experi-
mental Evidence », Mars 2017, 43 p. 
Les incitatifs fiscaux à la R&D 
entraînent des dépenses plus 
importantes en R&D chez les entreprises 
With growing academic and policy interest in 
research and development (R&D) tax incentives, 
the question about their effectiveness has become 
ever more relevant. In the absence of an exoge-
nous policy reform, the simultaneous determina-
tion of companies’ tax positions and their R&D 
spending causes an identification problem in eva-
luating tax incentives. To overcome this identifi-
cation challenge, we exploit a U.K. policy reform 
and use the population of corporation tax records 
that provide precise information on the amount of 
firm-level R&D expenditure. Using difference-in-
differences and other panel regression ap-
proaches, we find a positive and significant impact 
of tax incentives on R&D spending, and an im-
plied user cost elasticity estimate of around -1.6. 
This translates to more than a pound in additional 
private R&D for each pound foregone in corpora-
tion tax revenue. 
TAX AND TRANSFER POLICY IN-
STITUTE 
S. Hasan et M. Sinning, « GST Reform in 
Australia: Implications of Estimating 
Price Elasticities of Demand for Food », 
Mars 2017, 28 p. 
Augmenter les taxes de vente sur la 
nourriture, tout en compensant les 
ménages à faibles revenus pour cette 
hausse, pourrait rapporter beaucoup au 
gouvernement australien 
This paper uses detailed information about house-
hold supermarket purchases from the Australian 
Nielsen Homescan Survey to estimate price elas-
ticities of demand for a range of food categories. 
An instrumental variable strategy is employed to 
address endogeneity issues. The estimates obtai-
ned from our analysis are used to study five sce-
narios in which the rate of the GST on food catego-
ries is increased or in which the tax base is broa-
dened to include currently GST-free categories. 
Our findings reveal that there is considerable 
scope for raising revenue by increasing the rate 
and broadening the tax base. Low-income house-
holds (the bottom 40% of the income distribution) 
can be compensated for the loss in consumption 
induced by a tax increase. We demonstrate that 
increasing the rate of the GST from 10% to 15% 
and broadening the tax base would increase tax 
revenues by up to $8.6 billion, whereas compensa-
ting lowincome households would require up to 
$2.2 billion. We also provide a detailed list of tax 
revenues and compensation payments associated 
with each food category to allow readers to “build 
their own tax reform” by choosing the categories 
that should be taxed. 
AUTRES 
 Budget 2017-2018 
 Budget 2017 
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